

NOTES

Notes to chapter 1

- ¹ Ch. Harvey, J. Hintikka, "Modalization and Modalities", in Th. M. Seeböhm, D. Follesdal, J. N. Mohanty (eds.), *Phenomenology and the Formal Sciences*, Dordrecht/Boston/London, Kluwer 1991, pp.59-77.
- ² See E. Husserl, *Experience and Judgment*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1973, in part. §7; hereafter *EJ*.
- ³ *EJ*, 91.
- ⁴ *EJ*, 272.
- ⁵ Ch. Harvey, J. Hintikka, "Modalization and Modalities", cit., p.64.
- ⁶ Ch. Harvey, J. Hintikka, "Modalization and Modalities", cit., p.75.
- ⁷ See J. Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena: Introduction to the Problem of Signs in Husserl's Phenomenology*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1973; in part. see the chapter "Form and Meaning: A Note on the Phenomenology of Language" in the same volume.
- ⁸ L. Landgrebe, 'Unmittelbarkeit der Erfahrung', in L. Landgrebe (ed.), *Edmund Husserl. 1859-1959*, Martinus Nijhoff, La Haye 1959, p.253.
- ⁹ L. Landgrebe, cit., p.257.
- ¹⁰ Ch. Harvey, J. Hintikka, "Modalization and Modalities", cit., p.76.
- ¹¹ Ch. Harvey, J. Hintikka, "Modalization and Modalities", cit., p.76.
- ¹² P. Simons, 'Meaning and Language', in B. Smith and D. W. Smith (eds.) *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, p.132 .
- ¹³ *EJ*, 204.
- ¹⁴ *EJ*, 204.
- ¹⁵ *EJ*, 122.
- ¹⁶ *EJ*, 122.
- ¹⁷ A. Schuetz, "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy", in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. XX, 2, 1959, p.148.
- ¹⁸ See A. Schuetz, "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy", cit., p.150.
- ¹⁹ E. Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1969, p.320; hereafter *FLT*.
- ²⁰ *FLT*, 320.
- ²¹ See § 5 of E. Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution*, second book, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1989; hereafter *IPPII*.
- ²² J. N. Mohanty, "Intentionality and Possible World: Husserl and Hintikka", in H. Dreyfus (ed.), *Husserl: Intentionality and Cognitive Science*, MIT Press, Cambridge 1982, p.236.
- ²³ J. Hintikka, "Semantics for Propositional Attitudes", in Davis, Hockney, Wilson (eds.), *Philosophical Logic*, Reidel Dordrecht 1969, p.24.
- ²⁴ R. Cobb-Stevens, *Husserl and Analytic Philosophy*, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1990, pp.1-2.
- ²⁵ Th. M. Seeböhm, "Possible 'Worlds': Remarks about a Controversy", in F.M. Kirkland, D.P. Chattopadhyaya (eds.), *Phenomenology: East and West. Essays in Honor of J. N. Mohanty*, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1993, p.141.
- ²⁶ D. Lohmar, *Erfahrung und kategoriales Denken. Hume, Kant und Husserl ueber vorpraedikative Erfahrung und praedikative Erkenntnis*, Dordrecht, Kluwer 1998.
- ²⁷ D. Lohmar, *Erfahrung und kategoriales Denken. Hume, Kant und Husserl ueber vorpraedikative Erfahrung und praedikative Erkenntnis*, cit., p.252.
- ²⁸ *EJ*, 202.
- ²⁹ E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, Kluwer, Dordrecht 2001, p.95; hereafter *ACP*.
- ³⁰ *ACP*, 96.
- ³¹ Cfr. *EJ*, 199.

- ³² D. Lohmar, *Erfahrung und kategoriales Denken. Hume, Kant und Husserl ueber vorpraedikative Erfahrung und praedikative Erkenntnis*, cit. p. 253.
- ³³ *EJ*, 203.
- ³⁴ *EJ*, 203.
- ³⁵ Ch. Harvey, J. Hintikka, "Modalization and Modalities", cit., p.66.
- ³⁶ *EJ*, 239.
- ³⁷ J. N. Mohanty, "Intentionality and Possible World: Husserl and Hintikka", cit., 251.
- ³⁸ J. N. Mohanty, "Husserl on 'possibility'", *Husserl Studies*, 1, 1984.
- ³⁹ *IPPII*, 275.
- ⁴⁰ Cfr. J. N., Mohanty, "Husserl on 'possibility'", cit., p.26.
- ⁴¹ *IPPI*, 205.
- ⁴² See M. Heidegger, *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache*, in Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 38, Frankfurt a. Main 1998, p.79.
- ⁴³ Cfr. E. Husserl, *Die Krisis der europaeischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie. Ergänzungsband. Texte aus dem Nachlass 1934-1937*, Kluwer, The Hague 1992, pp.425-426.
- ⁴⁴ E. Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1970, pp.142-143.
- ⁴⁵ Ms. K III 6/54a.

Notes to chapter 2

- ¹ E. Husserl, *Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907*, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1997, p.2; hereafter *TS*.
- ² See *IP*, 33.
- ³ *TS*, 2.
- ⁴ E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, vol. I, Routledge & Paul Kegan, London 1970, pp. 157-158.
- ⁵ E. Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1970, p. 123.
- ⁶ E. Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, vol. I, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1982, p.361; hereafter *IPPI*.
- ⁷ U. Claesges, *Edmund Husserls Theorie der Raumkonstitution*, Martinus Nijhoff, Den Haag 1964, p. 50.
- ⁸ *IPPI*, 361.
- ⁹ *IPPI*, 363.
- ¹⁰ E. Husserl, *Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, vol. II, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1989, p.41; hereafter *IPPII*.
- ¹¹ *IPPII*, 45.
- ¹² *IPPII*, 46.
- ¹³ *IPPII*, 47.
- ¹⁴ *TS*, 257.
- ¹⁵ *TS*, 132.
- ¹⁶ *TS*, 136.
- ¹⁷ *TS*, 137.
- ¹⁸ *TS*, 141.
- ¹⁹ *TS*, 143.
- ²⁰ *TS*, 149.
- ²¹ *TS*, 157.
- ²² *TS*, 158.
- ²³ *TS*, 169.
- ²⁴ *TS*, 208.
- ²⁵ *TS*, 208.
- ²⁶ *TS*, 210.
- ²⁷ *TS*, 213.
- ²⁸ *TS*, 230.
- ²⁹ *TS*, 238.
- ³⁰ *TS*, 241.
- ³¹ *TS*, 242.

- ³² See E.S. Casey, *The Fate of Place. A Philosophical History*, University of California Press, 1998, p.218.
- ³³ See E.S. Casey, *The Fate of Place. A Philosophical History*, cit., p.218.
- ³⁴ E.S. Casey, *The Fate of Place. A Philosophical History*, cit., p. 219.
- ³⁵ See, U. Claesges, *Edmund Husserls Theorie der Raumkonstitution*, cit., p.127.
- ³⁶ See L. Landgrebe, "Prinzipien einer Lehre vom Empfinden", in *Zeitschrift fuer philosophische Forschung*, VIII, 1954, p.205.
- ³⁷ U. Claesges, *Edmund Husserls Theorie der Raumkonstitution*, cit., p.129.
- ³⁸ U. Claesges, *Edmund Husserls Theorie der Raumkonstitution*, cit., p.122.
- ³⁹ E.S. Casey, *The Fate of Place. A Philosophical History*, cit., p.219.
- ⁴⁰ See Beilage 73, "Die Konstitution des Raumes in Synthetischen Uebergang von Nahraum zu Nahraum", in E. Husserl, *Zur Phaenomenologie des Intersubjectivitaet*. Zweiter Teil: 1921-28, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1973, where Husserl writes, among other things, that "der Raum [ist] konstituiert im Uebergang von Nahraum zu Nahraum durch Fernkinaesthenen" (p.546).
- ⁴¹ M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, State University of New York Press, Albany 1953, p. 135.
- ⁴² See M. Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, Harper & Row, New York 1971, p. 93.
- ⁴³ E.S. Casey, *The Fate of Place. A Philosophical History*, cit., p.220.
- ⁴⁴ E. Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, cit., p.217.

Notes to chapter 3

- ⁴⁵ R. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1979.
- ⁴⁶ R. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, cit., p.170.
- ⁴⁷ W. A. deVries, *Wilfrid Sellars*, McGill-Queen's University Press, Ithaca 2005, p.62.
- ⁴⁸ R. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, cit., p.64. Sellars points out that the question concerning the existence of *synthetic a priori* knowledge depends on a *decision* rather than on an *answer*: "What the decision should be, that is, which meaning (if any) should be attached to the term '*a priori*', it is by no means easy to say. Many factors are involved, by no means the least of which is a sense of belonging to one or other of the two major traditions of Western philosophy.... If one is tired of philosophical shibboleths, and finds important insights on both sides of the fence, one will content oneself with pointing out that while every conceptual frame involves propositions which, though synthetic, are true *ex vi terminorum*, every conceptual frame is also but one among many which compete for adoption in the market-place of experience" (*ITSA*, in *SPR*, 319-320).
- ⁴⁹ R. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, cit., p.174.
- ⁵⁰ According to Sellars, learning to use a language doesn't amount to learning to *obey* the rules for the use of its expressions; obeying rules, as a matter of fact, involves using the language in which the rules are formulated leading in this way to a *vicious regress*. To avoid this, we ought to substitute "the phrase 'learning to conform to the rules...' for 'learning to obey the rules...' where 'conforming to a rule enjoining the doing of A in circumstances C' is to be equated simply with 'doing A when the circumstances are C' - regardless of how one comes to do it" (*SRLG*, in *SPR*, 322). In doing so, learning to use a language (L) doesn't entail no longer having learned to use the metalanguage (ML), and so on.
- ⁵¹ R. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, cit., p.177.
- ⁵² L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Blackwell, Oxford 2001, pp.27^c-28^c; hereafter *PI*.
- ⁵³ R. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, cit., p.178. The claim that justification is a practice referred to what we already accept amounts to reject, in Sellars' point of view, the falsely atomistic conception of belief: individual beliefs, as a matter of fact, are neither meaningful nor justified in isolation from the conceptual framework of which they are part.
- ⁵⁴ Sellars writes: "Jones thinks out-loud: Lo! Here is a red apple. Now to say that this visual thinking-out-loud that something is the case is epistemically *justified* or *reasonable* or has authority is clearly *not* to say that Jones has correctly inferred from certain premises, which he has good reason to believe, that there is a red apple in front of him. For we are dealing with a *paradigm* case of non inferential belief. *The authority of the thinking accrues to it in quite a different way. It can be traced to the fact that Jones has learned to use the relevant words in perceptual situations*" (*SK*, 324).
- ⁵⁵ Sellars points out: "One of the forms taken by the Myth of the Given is the idea that there is, indeed *must* be, a structure of particular matter of fact such that (a) each fact can not only be non-inferentially known to be the case, but presupposes no other knowledge either of particular matter

of fact, or of general truth; and (b) such that the non-inferential knowledge of facts belonging to this structure constitutes the ultimate court of appeals for all factual claims- particular and general- about the world. It is important to note that I characterized the knowledge of fact belonging to this stratum as not only non-inferential but as presupposing no knowledge of other matter of fact whether particular or general. It might be thought that this is a redundancy, that knowledge (not belief or conviction, but knowledge) which logically presupposes knowledge of other facts *must* be inferential. This, however, as I hope to show, is itself an episode in the myth" (*EPM*, 164).

⁵⁶R. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, cit., note 12, p.179.

⁵⁷*ENWW*, 646.

⁵⁸*EPM*, 170.

⁵⁹See W. A. deVries, *Wilfrid Sellars*, cit., p.273; see also *SM*, 226.

⁶⁰W. A. deVries, *Wilfrid Sellars*, cit., p.273.

⁶¹*CDCM*, 285.

⁶²G. Gutting, "Philosophy of Science", in C.F. Delaney, M.J.Loux, Gary Gutting, W.D. Solomon (eds.), *The Synoptic Vision. Essays on the Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame 1977, p.88; see also *IM*, 322.

⁶³*EPM*, 160.

⁶⁴R. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, cit., p. 184.

⁶⁵R. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, cit., p. 186.

⁶⁶See J. McDowell, *Mind and World*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1996, p.46.

⁶⁷J. McDowell, *Mind and World*, cit., p.46.

⁶⁸*EPM*, 127.

⁶⁹See *EPM*, sec.62.

⁷⁰*EPM*, 195.

⁷¹*SK*, 59.

⁷²W. A. deVries, *Wilfrid Sellars*, cit., p.276.

⁷³J. McDowell, *Mind and World*, cit., p. xiv.

⁷⁴See *SK*, 295.

⁷⁵*SK*, 2.

⁷⁶*EPM*, 165.

⁷⁷*EPM*, 166.

⁷⁸*EPM*, 167.

⁷⁹*EPM*, 167-168.

⁸⁰*PSIM* in *SPR*, 27.

⁸¹*IAMB* in *PP*, 385.

⁸²Linguistic expressions, in Sellars' point of view, can play three important roles which, in some way, determine also their meanings:

1. *Language-entry transitions* thanks to which a speaker responds to objects (perceptible or introspectible), events or situations with linguistic activity;
2. *Intralinguistic moves* which concern various transition rules of the language like e.g. valid inference rules;
3. *Language-exit transitions* which transform linguistic episodes (e.g. 'I shall now eat a cake') in appropriate behaviors (in the case above, e.g., going to the kitchen, taking a cake and beginning to eat it).

For Sellars, as for Quine and Davidson, words have meaning only in the context of an entire language. See for this subject of matter *LRB*, 310; *SRLG* in *SPR*, 327-31; *NAO*, 67,69.

⁸³*IAMB* in *PP*, 385-6.

⁸⁴W. A. DeVries, *Wilfrid Sellars*, cit., p. 227.

⁸⁵R. C. Richardson, G. Muhlenberg, "Sellars and Sense Impressions", *Erkenntnis*, 17, 1982, pp.171-211.

⁸⁶See *SPR*, ch.4.

⁸⁷R. C. Richardson, G. Muhlenberg, "Sellars and Sense Impressions", cit., p. 12.

⁸⁸*EPM*, 170. It can be important to note that to dispose of foundation doesn't amount to refuse the possibility of immediate knowledge; the two questions, as a matter of fact, must be distinguished: "Even if there is something radically wrong with the concept of an immediate experience of a particular or of a fact, there is still the claim that some beliefs are self-warranted, the claim that some beliefs are epistemized by reliable noninferential origin, and so on" (W. P. Alston, "What's Wrong with Immediate Knowledge?", *Synthese*, 55, 1983, p.74.

⁸⁹ J. McDowell, *Mind and World*, cit., pp.135-136.

⁹⁰ J. McDowell, *Mind and World*, cit., p.8.

⁹¹ J. McDowell, *Mind and World*, cit., p.32.

⁹² J. McDowell, *Mind and World*, cit., p. 34.

⁹³ Distinguishing between a *legend* that doesn't imply neither the existence of an object nor its nonexistence, and a *myth*, which implies the nonexistence of an object, William S. Robinson tries to conclude that Sellars' view on the Given doesn't bring to argue that the Given is a myth; see W.S. Robinson, "The Legend of the Given" in H-N. Castañeda, (ed.), *Action, Knowledge, and Reality*, cit., p.83.

⁹⁴ *RNWR*, 46.

⁹⁵ *RNWR*, 46.

⁹⁶ Cfr. J. F. Rosenberg, *Fusing the images*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007, p.15.

⁹⁷ *EPM*, 172.

⁹⁸ *NAO*, 1-2.

⁹⁹ See *EPM*, 173.

¹⁰⁰ *EPM*, 173.

¹⁰¹ R. C. Richardson, G. Muhlenberg, "Sellars and Sense Impressions", cit., p.14.

¹⁰² *EPM*, 172.

Notes to chapter 4

¹ A preliminary version of this essay appeared with the title "Wittgenstein on colour-issues" in *Dialegethai. Rivista telematica di filosofia*, 10, 2008 [on-line: <http://mondodomani.org/dialegethai/>].

² Wittgenstein as a matter of fact states: "Tautology and contradiction are not pictures of the reality. They present no possible state of affairs. For the one allows every possible state of affairs, the other none." (*TLP*, prop.4.462)

³ See R. Ciuni, "The colour exclusion problem and 'synthetic a priori' propositions between *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and *Some Remarks on Logical Form*" in A. Coliva, E. Picardi, *Wittgenstein today*, Il Poligrafo, Padova 2004, pp.121-139.

⁴ E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, vol.II, Routledge, London 2001, p.21.

⁵ R. Ciuni, "The colour exclusion problem and 'synthetic a priori' propositions between *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and *Some Remarks on Logical Form*", cit., p.126.

⁶ Proposition 4.221 of *TLP* states: "It is obvious that in the analysis of propositions we must come to elementary propositions, which consist of names in immediate combination".

⁷ E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, vol.II, cit., p.21. Husserl states fully and clearly that a synthetic proposition is a specification (*Besonderung*) of synthetic *a priori* laws; empirical specifications are, of course, propositions like "This red is different from this green".

⁸ E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, vol.II, cit., p.19.

⁹ Cfr. F. Waismann, *Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, Blackwell, Oxford 1979; in part. see pp. 102-107.

¹⁰ Cfr. F. Waismann, *Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, cit., pp. 67-68.

¹¹ E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, vol. II, cit., p.4.

¹² In *TLP*, prop. 2.0131, Wittgenstein writes: "A speck in the visual field, though it need not be red, must have some colour: it is, so to speak, surrounded by colour-space." In prop. 2.0251, Wittgenstein clarifies also that "Space, time, and colour (being coloured) are forms of objects".

¹³ See L. Wittgenstein, *Remarks on Colour*, Blackwell, Oxford 1977, sec. 218; hereafter *RC*.

¹⁴ Cfr. L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Remarks*, Blackwell, Oxford 1975, sec.219; hereafter *PR*.

¹⁵ *PR*, sec 1.

¹⁶ See *PR*, sec. 219, 220.

¹⁷ *PR*, sec.3.

¹⁸ *PR*, sec.4.

¹⁹ See *PR*, sec. 221.

²⁰ Byong-Chul Park, *Phenomenological Aspects of Wittgenstein's Philosophy*, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1998, p.140.

²¹ L. Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the "Philosophical Investigations"*, Blackwell, Oxford 1958, p.56.

²² L. Wittgenstein, *The Big Typescript: TS 213*, Blackwell, Oxford 2005, p.320e; hereafter *BT*.

According to Merrill Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka even the introduction of the notion of language-games does not yet provide a basis for rejecting phenomenological language. See M.B. Hintikka, J. Hintikka, *Investigating Wittgenstein*, Blackwell, Oxford 1986, p.242.

²³ For Jaakko Hintikka a typical use of the adjective “phenomenological” is found in thermodynamics where a phenomenological approach is contrasted to a statistical one. See J. Hintikka, “The Idea in Phenomenology”, in K. Lehrer and J.C. Marek (eds.), *Austrian Philosophy: Past and Present. Essays in Honour of Rudolph Haller*, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1997.

²⁴ See for this matter of fact E. Husserl, *Phaenomenologische Psychologie*, Martinus Nijhoff, Den Haag 1962, pp.302-303.

²⁵ *PR*, sec. I.

²⁶ L. Waismann, *Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, cit., p.45.

²⁷ *PR*, sec.11.

²⁸ See *PR*, sec. 68; Wittgenstein writes: “Isn’t it clear that this would be the most immediate description we can possibly imagine? That is to say, that anything which tried to be more immediate still would inevitably cease to be a description”.

²⁹ See the following passage in *RC*, II, sec. 16: “Phenomenological analysis (as e.g. Goethe would have it) is analysis of concepts and can neither with nor contradict physics”. For this reason Wittgenstein’s researches on colours don’t amount to a psychological investigation, so that all the assertions about them are not assumed as propositions of natural history. See also the following passages in *RC*, III, sec., 9-10: “If we say that the proposition ‘saturated yellow is lighter than saturated blue’ doesn’t belong to the realm of psychology (for only *so* could it be natural history)- this means that we are not *using* it as a proposition of natural history. And the question then is : what is the other, non-temporal *use* like?”. “For this is the only way we can distinguish propositions of ‘the mathematics of colour’ from those of natural history”.

³⁰ *BT*, 323e.

³¹ *BT*, 324e.

³² N. F. Gier, *Wittgenstein and Phenomenology: A Comparative Study of the Later Wittgenstein, Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty*, State University of New York Press, Albany 1981.

³³ P.M.S. Hacker, “The Rise and Fall of the Picture Theory”, in I. Block (ed.), *Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, Blackwell, Oxford 1981, pp.86-87.

³⁴ A. Kenny, *Wittgenstein*, The Penguin Press, Harmondsworth 1973, p.114.

³⁵ L. Wittgenstein, *Remarks on Logical Form*, in I.M. Copi, R.W. Beard, (eds.), *Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, London 1966, p. 30; hereafter *RLF*.

³⁶ *RLF*, 32.

³⁷ *RLF*, 32.

³⁸ *RLF*, 35.

³⁹ M. McGinn, “Wittgenstein on colour: from logic to grammar”, in A. Coliva, E. Picardi (eds.), *Wittgenstein today*, Il Poligrafo, Padova 2004, p. 114.

⁴⁰ L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Blackwell, Oxford 1953, sec.108; hereafter *PI*.

⁴¹ *TLP*, prop. 5.5563.

⁴² *PI*, sec. 124.

⁴³ *PI*, sec. 125.

⁴⁴ *PI*, sec. 126.

⁴⁵ L. Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books*, cit., pp.17-20.

⁴⁶ *RC*, sec.1.

⁴⁷ *RC*, sec.1-63.

⁴⁸ *RC*, sec. III-30.

⁴⁹ *RC*, sec. I-76.

⁵⁰ *RC*, sec. III-112.

⁵¹ In *RC*, III-332, Wittgenstein writes: “Couldn’t seeing be the *exception*? [I.e. rather than blindness being the exception.] But neither the blind nor the sighted could describe it, except as an ability to do this or that. Including e.g. playing certain language-games; but we must be careful how we describe these games”.

⁵² *RC*, III-71.

⁵³ *RC*, III-72.

⁵⁴ M.B. Hintikka, J. Hintikka, , *Investigating Wittgenstein*, cit., p.295.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁶ *PI*, sec. 56.

⁵⁷ Wittgenstein writes: “[...] the language-game with colours is characterized by what we are able to do, and what we are not able to do” (*Zettel*, sec.345). Another passage contained in *Remarks on Colours* is considerable in order to understand Wittgenstein’s rejection of inner experiences: “If the psychologist teaches us, ‘There are people who see’, we can then ask him: ‘And what do you call ‘people who see’?’” The answer to that would have to be: People who behave so-and-so under such-and-such circumstances” (*RC*, sec. I-88).

⁵⁸ *PI*, sec.280.

⁵⁹ M.B. Hintikka, J. Hintikka, *Investigating Wittgenstein*, cit., p.301.

⁶⁰ *BT*, 55e-56e.

⁶¹ *RC*, sec. III- 19; see also *RC*, III- 43.